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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Assuming, arguendo, that the standard of review in this appeal
is the reasonable

and rational standard

as asserted by the

Respondent, even under a reasonable and rational standard of review
the final agency's finding of just cause for denial of unemployment
benefits should be reversed.1

The final agency's finding of

"harm," knowledge and control is clearly not a reasonable and
rational interpretation or application of the agency's Rules on
just cause, contravenes the spirit and purpose of the Employment
Security Act, and is contrary to case law interpreting the Rules.
I.

THE ELEMENT OF CULPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST
MERELY BECAUSE THE EMPLOYER HAS BEEN HARMED BY
THE CLAIMANT'S ACTS

The Rules and case law "require a balancing of harm against
the employee's prior work record, length of employment and the
likelihood the conduct will be repeated."

Gibson v. Dept. of

Employment Security, 840 P.2d 780, 785 (Utah App. 1992) [citing Utah
Admin. Code R475-5b-102(l)(a)(1) (1992)].

In Gibson, an employee

for US West was discharged for breaching company rules prohibiting
disclosure of client information.

See generally Gibson, 840 P.2d

780. The employee unknowingly disclosed information about a client
to the only person in the world who could use the information
against the client.

Id.

1

Petitioner contends that the appropriate standard of review
in this particular appeal should be a correctness-of-error
standard.
See Brief of Appellant as well as Argument IV of
Appellant's Reply Brief herein.

1

The Gibson court reversed the Board of Review's decision
denying unemployment benefits because the court found that the
Board had failed to balance the demonstrated harm to the employer's
interests against the employee's prior work record, length of
employment and the likelihood that the conduct would be repeated.
Gibson, 840 P.2d at 785. The Board did not give adequate attention
to

the

factors

relevant

in

a

determination

of

culpability.

Specifically, "the Board failed to discuss the weight, if any, it
gave to the unintentional nature of the act and [the employee's]
exemplary work record."

Id. (emphasis added). The court held "the

Board's denial of unemployment benefits was unreasonable in light
of the broad remedial purposes of and the liberal interpretation we
grant to the Employment Security Act, and the Board's inadequate
consideration of the relevant factors in denying unemployment
compensation."

Id.

Respondent argues that notwithstanding the Gibson holding, the
courts have ruled that "some conduct may be so egregious and may so
seriously affect the employer's legitimate interests, that a single
incident

is

sufficient

to

satisfy

the

culpability

element."

Respondent cites Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Com'n, 700
P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) and Grinnell v. Industrial Com'n, 732 P.2d
113 (Utah 1987) in support of this claim.

Nevertheless, Kehl and

Grinnell are easily distinguishable from the case at hand.
In Kehl, a forklift driver was discharged

for a single

violation of a company rule. She deliberately failed to stop at a
railroad crossing while carrying a load of explosives.

2

The court

held that the discharge was "necessary to avoid actual or potential
harm to the employer's rightful interests."
1134.

Kehl. 700 P.2d at

The court quoted specific provisions from the rules which

must be balanced to determine if the discharge was for just cause:
A discharge is not necessary "if [the discharge] is not
consistent with reasonable employment practices [and] the
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in context of
the particular employment and how it affects the
employer's rights." Id.
In the Grinnell case, a truck driver was discharged for
violating

several

company

safety

rules.

The

driver

had

deliberately disconnected the road speed governor on his truck,
drove too fast, and for an excessive length of time. Grinnell, 732
P.2d 113.

He also had ingested marijuana during his last cross-

country trip. Id. at 115. The Grinnell court stated in dicta that
the driver's conduct in operating the heavy vehicle on the highways
was one of those instances where a single violation may support a
just cause termination.2

Id. The court's finding in Grinnell that

the driver had the opportunity to prevent or control the violations
further shows that the court considered the intentional nature of
the act versus the potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests and the wrongness of the conduct in the context of the
particular employment.

Id.

2

The detailed factual analysis invoked by the Grinnell court
shows that the court was conscious of the need to consider the
wrongness of the conduct in the context of the particular
employment against the harm to the employer's interests.
The
effect of the court's analysis is to substantiate the Kehl court's
balancing of factors approach in ruling on a just cause claim. See
Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Com'n, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134
(Utah 1985).
3

Although a single isolated incidentf if sufficiently serious,
might justify a denial of unemployment benefits, it is an exception
to the general rule that benefits will be allowed.

Both Kehl and

Grinnell, howeverf require a balancing of factors in determining if
a termination based on that single, isolated incident supports a
finding of just cause.3
Furthermore, there exists no support in the Rules or case law
to substantiate Respondent's claim that "harm" and culpability are
interchangeable terms, or that a finding of harm alone satisfies
the element of culpability.

It is therefore unreasonable and

irrational that the Board's finding of harm alone could satisfy the
element of culpability.

In fact, the final agency action never

considered the element of "culpability" as required by its own
Rules and case law.
II.

THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO
AN EMPLOYEE WHO'S REFLEXIVE ACT RESULTS IN A
VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY

Utah Administrative Code S R562-5b-102.1.b. provides:
The employee must have had knowledge of the conduct
which the employer expected. . . . he must reasonably
have been able to anticipate the effect his conduct would
have.
Dissenting

from

the

Board's

decision,

Judge

Lewis

characterized Petitioner's conduct as a natural, reflexive response
"to

turn

slightly

when

spoken

3

to."

(R.82).

Such

a

Kehl also found that the employee knowingly violated the
company rules. 700 P.2d at 1135. In the present case, the actual
or potential harm to the employer resulted from a reflexive act by
the employee.
An individual who responds reflexively in a
situation can hardly be held to have knowingly violated a company
rule.

4

characterization is consistent with the undisputed facts that a coworker unexpectantly approached Petitioner and began talking to him
about a work-related matter. (R.54). Petitioner diverted his eyes
from the crane for "a few seconds" in reaction to the unexpected
distraction.

(R.54).

Respondent argues, "[Petitioner] understood the necessity of
the employer's requirement for absolute attention while operating
the crane completely satisfies the knowledge element."
interpretation

is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the

Employment Security Act and case law.
Employment

Such an

The provisions of the

Security Act are to be "liberally construe[d] and

administer[ed]."

Utah Admin. Code R562-2-1.1. The purpose of the

Rules and guidelines in determining just cause "is to deny benefits
to individuals who bring about their own unemployment by conducting
themselves, with respect to their employment with callousness,
misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree that the
employer is justified in discharging the employee."
Code R562-5b-101.

Utah Admin.

Generally, "[i]n applying these Rules [of the

Employment Security Act] to individual cases the Department will
consider the reasonableness of claimant's actions, the totality of
the employment situation, and whether the claimant has a genuine
continuing attachment to the labor market."

Id.

Specifically,

with regard to the element of knowledge, the Rules require the
Board to balance various factors and consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether knowledge exists.

5

See Utah

Admin. Code R562-2-1. Respondent's argument that mere knowledge of
the employer's expectations satisfies the knowledge requirement of
the Rules is too narrow and restrictive an interpretation of the
Rules and misconstrues the purpose of the Employment Security Act.
For example, an inconsistent application of the disciplinary
rules by the employer is one factor which will ameliorate a finding
that the employee had knowledge of the employer's expectations.
See Utah Admin. Code R562-5b-102. l.b.; See also Utah Admin. Code
R562-5b-101.

In the present case, the employer inconsistently

enforced its disciplinary policy. In an earlier crane incident the
responsible employee was not fired but merely had her crane
certification revoked.

Respondent claims that the bare fact that

the employer revoked that crane operator's crane certification was
clear notice that "carelessness or mistakes in crane operation
would not be tolerated by the employer."
accident,

the

employee

who

initiated

In the June 1, 1993 crane
the

interchange

with

Petitioner, contrary to company rules, was not disciplined in any
way.

Respondent's claim that carelessness and mistakes were in

fact tolerated is unfounded.
In each

of these

incidents

it's not disputed

that the

employees involved were each aware of the company rules, however,
only Petitioner was held to be absolutely responsible for violation
of the rules.

The other employees who acted contrary to express

company rules received a more lenient punishment or simply were not
disciplined in any way.

These incidents are proof that the

employer was arbitrary and inconsistent in its treatment of job6

related incidents.

Such an inconsistent application of company

policies does not support a finding of knowledge.

The Board of

Review's finding that knowledge was present is contrary to the
agency's own rules and therefore, is an unreasonable and irrational
decision.
In addition, "[j]ust cause may not be established when the
reason for the discharge is based on such things as mere mistakes,
. inadvertence in isolated instances, . . . etc.

These

examples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the lack of
knowledge

or

control."

Utah

Admin.

Code

R562-5b-102.2.

Petitioner's reflexive motion of adverting his eyes from his work
for a few seconds, when unexpectedly approached by a co-worker, was
the sole reason for his discharge.

Petitioner did admit that he

made the mistake of losing visual contact with the crane.

(R.43).

However, such a mistake does not satisfy the element of knowledge.
Moreover, such a mistake or inadvertence in an isolated instance
can hardly be construed to be the "callousness, misbehavior, or
lack of consideration" envision by the drafters of the Rules to
support a finding of just cause. See Utah Admin. Code R562-5b-101.
The Board of Review's finding that Petitioner had knowledge is
neither a reasonable nor rational application of the Rules and is
contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Employment Security Act.
III. A REFLEXIVE REACTION IS NOT CONDUCT WHICH CAN
BE CONSTRUED TO BE WITHIN THE POWER OF AN
EMPLOYEE TO CONTROL
The Rules provide "the conduct must have been within the power
and capacity of the claimant to control or prevent."
7

Utah Admin.

Code R562-5b-102.1.c. Petitioner was operating a crane box when a
co-worker unexpectantly approached him to speak about a workrelated matter.

(R.54).

As a result of a

"third party,"

Petitioner diverted his eyes from his work for a few seconds.
(R.54).
In his dissent, Judge Lewis characterized Petitioner's actions
as a natural, reflexive response to turn slightly when spoken to.
(R.82).

"Reflex" is defined as "an involuntary action." Webster's

New World Dictionary 1221 (college ed. 1968).

We all reflexively

respond to a myriad of stimuli. Most are in the form of innocuous,
nonthreatening stimuli, such as a pat on the back from behind, a
unexpected remark, etc.
Petitioner's

The verbal interchange initiated by

co-worker was

an unexpected,

innocuous

stimulus

causing Petitioner to unintentionally divert his eyes off his work
for a few seconds. Such reflexive conduct is not within the power
or capacity of an individual to control at all times and does not
embody the callousness, misbehavior or lack of consideration
punishable under the Employment Security Act.
that

"it was

within

[Petitioner's]

The Board's finding

control

to

do

his

job

correctly," is too narrow a characterization of the circumstances
and too restrictive an interpretation of the element of control.
The Board's holding that the element of control existed

is

unreasonable and irrational and should be reversed.
IV. CORRECTION-OF-ERROR STANDARD SHOULD BE USED
WHEN THE FINAL AGENCY ACTION FAILS TO CONSIDER ALL THE
LEGAL FACTORS UNDERLYING EACH ELEMENT ESTABLISHING JUST CAUSE.
Some cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to

8

Utah Code S 35-4-5(b)(1) have found that the Industrial Commission
was granted an apparent explicit discretion to determine whether a
claimant was discharged for just cause.4

Neverthless, Petitioner

contends that even if the Industrial Commission has discretion, it
is

not

automatic

if

the

agency

has

promulgated

administrative rules governing the statute.

specific

Thus, the limited

discretion accorded to the Respondent agency under Utah Code § 3 5 4-5(b)(1) was displaced by the promulgation and adoption of the
administrative rules on just cause ("Rules"). See Utah Admin. Code
R562-2-1; See also Lane v. Board of Review of Industrial Com'n, 727
P.2d 206, 208 n.3 (Utah 1986).
cause

now

serve

The administrative rules on just

as the basis

of decision

unemployment compensation benefits.

for a claim

for

Lane, 727 P.2d at 208 n.3.

The Rules were "written to explain and clarify the application
of the [Employment Security] Act."

Utah Admin. Code R562-2-1.

Therefore, the general language of Utah Code S 35-4-5 was replaced
with the specific standards enumerated in the Rules. Although the
Industrial Commission is granted the authority to administer the
Rules, the agency must apply the enumerated factors outlined in the
Rules to any just cause claim and subsequent ruling.
In the present case, the Board of Review issued a decision
devoid of any attention to the various factors underlying each
element establishing just cause.

The Board's failure to consider

and balance the various statutorily enumerated factors encompassing
4

See Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451
(Utah App. 1991): and King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv.
Rep. 33, 36 (Utah App. 1993).
9

a

determination

of

just cause

renders

the

Board's

arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion.

decision

Its findings

of facts and conclusions of law in the case at hand are clearly
insufficient as mandated by Utah's Administrative Procedure Act.
In failing to resolve all the elements of just cause before
rendering a decision, the Board has substantially prejudiced the
claimant's rights.

The Board's erroneous interpretation and

application of the rules on just cause also has substantially
prejudiced the claimant's rights. In short, the Board has rendered
a

decision

contrary

to

the

expressed

standards

of

the

administrative rules on just cause and case law interpreting the
Rules.

Therefore, this court should not defer to the Board's

decision

and

review this matter

under

a

correction-of-error

standard.5
V. BECAUSE PETITIONER'S APPEAL IN THE CASE AT HAND
INVOLVES UNSETTLED SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF LAW
AND COMPLICATED ISSUES OF LAN, A WRITTEN DECISION
SHOULD BE ISSUED RATHER THAN A DECISION UNDER RULE 31
By an Order of this Court on April 14, 1993, this Court
assigned this appeal to the Rule 31 Calendar. Since neither party
requested a Rule 31 assignment, Petitioner does not know the reason
why the Court assigned this appeal to the Rule 31 calendar.

When

Oral Argument is held on May 17, 1993, Petitioner requests the
Court to reconsider its Order issued on April 14, 1993# and to

5

Petitioner contends that Kino v. Industrial Commission, 209
Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah App. 1993) is not dispositive of the
question as to what standard of review shall be used when an agency
has promulgated specific administrative rules that limit the
agency's interpeation of said rules.

10

issue a written opinion.6
Petitioner contends that the Respondent agency is asking the
Court to make an expanded ruling that is inconsistent with the
agency's own Rules and case law on the issue of whether "harm"
alone is sufficient for a finding of "culpability", one of the
three factors that the employer must show in its burden of proof.
There exists no support in the agency's Rules or case law to
substantiate Respondent's claim that "harm" and culpability are
interchangeable terms, or that a finding of harm alone satisfies
the element of culpability.

Therefore, it is unreasonable and

irrational that the Board's finding of harm alone could satisfy the
element of culpability.
Respondent relies upon Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial
Com'n. 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) and Grinnell v. Industrial Com'n,
732 P.2d 113 (Utah 1987) in support of the final agency's action
denying unemployment benefits to the Petitioner.

Both Kehl and

Grinnell require a balancing of factors, however, in determining if
a termination based on that single, isolated incident supports a
finding of just cause.

The court in Kehl also found that the

employee knowingly violated the company rules.
1135.

Kehl. 700 P.2d at

In the present case, the actual or potential harm to the

6

If the reason this appeal was assigned to the Rule 31
Calendar is due to this Court's recent decision in King v.
Industrial Commission. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 33-38 (Utah App.
1993) which fails to support Petitioner's contention that the
Standard of Review is a Correction-Of-Error standard, Petitioner
still maintains even when using the "reasonable and rational"
standard of review that this appeal raises significant issues of
law and that the substantive rules of law are unsettled as
discussed above in the Reply Brief of Appellant.

11

employer resulted from a reflexive act by the employee.

An

individual who responds reflexively in a situation can hardly be
held to have intentionally violated a company rule.

Not only did

the Respondent employer fail to meet its burden of proof in the
case at hand, the Respondent agency failed to comply with its own
Rules and case law.
Hence, these issues are more than uncomplicated issues of law
and furthermore, the substantive rules of law do not appear to be
settled.
agency

Otherwise, the final agency action by the Respondent

would

have

affirmed

the

ALJ's

decision

and

awarded

unemployment benefits to the Petitioner/Claimant.
CONCLUSION
The administrative rules on just cause delineate specific
factors the Industrial Commission must consider in determining the
validity of a just cause claim.

The agency failed to consider any

of these factors in its decision. The agency's decision should not
be accorded any weight and this court should review the agency
ruling under a correction-of-error standard.
Respondent has argued that the Board's decision, however,
should be reviewed under a reasonable and rational

standard.

Assuming, arguendo. such a standard of review is appropriate, the
Board's denial of benefits based on a finding of harm, knowledge
and control is nevertheless unreasonable and irrational.
The Board's failure to consider and balance the various
statutorily enumerated factors encompassing a determination of just
cause renders the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious and an
12

abuse of discretion.

In failing to resolve all the elements of

just cause before rendering a decision, the Board has substantially
prejudiced

the

claimant's

rights.

The

Board's

erroneous

interpretation and application of the Rules on just cause also has
substantially prejudiced the claimant's rights.
Board

has

unreasonably

and

irrationally

In short, the

rendered

a decision

contrary to the expressed standards of the administrative rules on
just cause and case law interpreting the Rules.

Therefore, the

Board's finding of just cause and denial of benefits should be
reversed

and

unemployment

compensation

benefits

should

be

reinstated and awarded to the Petitioner.
DATED this 19th day of April, 1993.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellant

BY: DAVID G.

C H A L L E D \

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, David G. dialled, certify that on this 19th day of April,
1993, that I mailed by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: Emma R. Thomas, legal counsel for Respondent
Utah Department of Employment Security, 140 East 300 South, P.O.
Box 11600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147; and four (4) true and
correct

copies

to

Respondent

McDonnell

Douglas

Corporation,

Personnel Department, 1215 North 2200 West, Salt Lake City, Utah

13

